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Original Acquisition of Property: 
From Conquest & Possession to  
Democracy & Equal Opportunity
α 
 
Joseph William Singer
β 
 
 
"I have been  thinking,"  said Arthur,  "about Might and 
Right. I don't think things ought to be done because you are 
able  to do  them. I  think  they  should be done because you 
ought to do them. After all, a penny is a penny in any case, 
however much Might is exerted on either side, to prove that 
it is or is not. Is that plain?"
χ 
~ T.H. White 
 
 
WHERE  DO  PROPERTY  RIGHTS  COME  FROM?  If  you  believe  the  property 
casebooks,  we  acquire  original  title  to  property  by  conquering  other 
nations, hunting animals, catching baseballs, encroaching on our neighbors’ 
lands, drilling for oil, and finding lost jewels.
1 You've heard the expression 
"possession is nine-tenths of the law." It turns out it's actually true. If you 
can  take  it,  you  can  keep  it  –  not  exactly  the  most  morally  attractive 
justification for the rights of owners. Imagine teaching your children that 
the  way  to  get  things  is  to  grab  whatever  they  can.  But  maybe  there  is 
something to the possession theory. What would we have to believe to make 
possession a just original source of title to property? 
 Possession is plausible as a source  of title only if you are  not  taking 
something  that  already  belongs  to  someone  else.  If  you  are  the  first 
possessor  of an unowned  object, like a wild animal or a deserted island, 
possession is like magic; it allows you to create something out of nothing. 
Who could reasonably object to your claim? No one has been displaced by 
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go to Dean Lauren Robel and the Indiana University Maurer School of Law for inviting me to 
give  this address as the Harris Lecture on April 5, 2010 and for the helpful comments and 
suggestions I received from the faculty. 
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your act of occupation and everyone else is perfectly free to go out and hunt 
their own foxes and discover their own uncharted shores. 
 Two problems disturb this rosy scenario. First, the magic disappears if 
you take all the cookies on the plate and leave none for your little sister. As 
John Locke recognized long ago, possession raises no moral issues only as 
long  as  it  does  not  deprive  others  of  similar  paths  to  ownership.  Locke 
argued that property rights in land were justified only if “there is enough 
and as good left in common for others.”
2 This little caveat is affectionately 
called the "Lockean proviso." If I occupy land and others do not have equal 
opportunities to do the same thing, then my act of first possession cannot be 
considered to be what John Stuart Mill called a self-regarding act; rather, my 
actions  impose  externalities  on  others.
3  And  those  externalities  are  not 
minor  in  nature;  because  human  beings  need  things  to  survive, 
monopolizing things needed for human life can only be justified if others 
have equal opportunity to get what they need.
4 This makes the relationship 
between possession and equal opportunity a central problem. 
 The second wrinkle with the original possession idea is the unfortunate 
fact that most things already do have owners, and if you grab something 
originally possessed by someone else, then you are not a first possessor. 
When you dispossess another possessor, you have done something wrong. 
We have words for someone like you and they are not pretty words; if you 
take someone else's car we call you a thief and if you take someone else's 
country, we use words like imperialism and conquest. When you steal a car, 
your title is no good no matter how long you possess it. In U.S. law, thieves 
do not acquire good title to property, no matter how long they keep their 
booty. But conquest is another matter; here is a case where theft does confer 
legal rights. International law may condemn conquest but it also rewards the 
conquerors with sovereignty. As Thucydides reports in The Peloponnesian 
War, the Athenians justified their conquest of Melos by arguing "You know 
as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between 
equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what 
they must."
5 
 For us in  the United States,  this is  not merely a theoretical problem. 
When  Europeans  first  came  here,  America  was  not  an  empty  land.  The 
colonial powers acquired the land from the native inhabitants by conquest. 
                                                   
2 JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ¶27, at 288 
(1690)(Cambridge U. Press., Peter Laslett ed. 1988). 
3  On  the  slippery  distinction  between  self-regarding  and  other-regarding  acts,  see  Joseph 
William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership, in PROPERTY AND 
COMMUNITY  (Gregory  S.  Alexander  &   Eduardo  Peñalver  eds.  2010).  See  also  Gregory  S. 
Alexander,  The  Social-Obligation  Norm  in  American  Property  Law,  94  CORNELL  L.  REV.  745 
(2009)(explaining the social obligations inherent in legitimate ownership claims); Eduardo 
Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009)(explaining the social consequences of 
recognizing property rights). 
4 LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 125–27 (2003). 
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Sometimes  they  simply  occupied  native  lands;  sometimes  they  entered 
treaties to force Indian nations to sell their land; sometimes they engaged in 
conquest by legislation, simply passing a statute transferring Indian title to 
the colonial power. Conquest denies the rights of first possessors. If first 
possession is the legitimate origin of title, then we non-Indians cannot trace 
our titles to a just origin. 
 To make clear that these issues are not merely theoretical, consider the 
case  of Cobell  v.  Salazar.
6  In 1996, a class action  was brought against  the 
United States alleging that the Departments of Interior and Treasury and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs mismanaged the property of individual Indians. The 
U.S. government manages many lands owned by individual tribal members 
and often leases those lands to oil and gas interests. The Indian land owners 
are  entitled  to  receive  royalties  on  whatever  is  found  on  those  lands. 
Unfortunately, the government did a horrendously bad job of managing the 
accounts,  often  not  making  the  payments  to  the  Indian  owners  and 
eventually  losing  records.  The  payments  were  either  not  made  or  the 
government kept the money and failed to turn it over to the Indian owners. 
Because the records were lost, it is hard to say how much money is owed to 
the Indian owners but the amount may be as high as 50 billion dollars. After 
more than 15 years of litigation, a federal judge has approved a settlement of 
$3.4 billion of which $1.4 billion would go to the Indian owners; this amounts 
to roughly $1000 per person.
7 Three and a half billion dollars is a lot of money 
but everyone agrees it is far less than what is actually owed. Congress must 
approve  the  settlement  and  appropriate  the  funds  and  is  conducting 
hearings  now  on  the  matter.
8  Indians  disagree  among  themselves  on 
whether  the  settlement  is  a  good  or  a  bad  thing.
9  Some  argue  that  the 
plaintiffs should not settle for an amount that is so far less than what they 
are probably owed while others argue that this is best we can expect and that 
proving the amount owed is not possible given the lost records. Let's be clear 
that these are not welfare payments that are contemplated; these Indians are 
landowners  and  the  government  effectively  stole  their  property  by  not 
paying them these royalties. At the same time, the difficulty and expense of 
figuring out much each person is owed could take years and the government 
has  failed to do  this despite  numerous  court  orders and a federal  statute 
ordering it to do so. How the Congress responds will tell us whether or not 
the United States does respect the rights of first possessors. 
                                                   
6 See Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
7 U.S. Dept. of Interior, News Release:  Secretary  Salazar,  Attorney General  Holder  Announce 
Settlement  of  Cobell  Lawsuit  on  Indian  Trust  Management, 
http://www.doi.gov/ost/cobell/FINAL_12-08-09_Cobell_release_as_revised_12-
7PM_FINAL.pdf. 
8 Rob Capriccioso, Cobell settlement waits for Congress, Indian Country Today (Dec. 24, 2009), 
http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/80056982.html. 
9  Rob Capriccioso, Congress  hears  Cobell  critiques;  collusion  charged,  Indian Country Today, 
Mar. 17, 2010, at 1, http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/national/87464532.html. SINGER 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 Land titles in the United States suffer from two, rather fundamental, 
defects: the problem of conquest and the problem of the Lockean proviso. 
How worried should we be about this? How much do these complications 
undermine our current titles to land? And if, as I will argue, they are both 
serious issues, what are we to do about it?  
 
1. FROM CONQUEST TO DEMOCRACY 
 
 Let's start with the issue of conquest. Both our philosophical traditions 
and our property law casebooks suggest that first possession is the origin of 
property. But title to land in the United States rests on the forced taking of 
land  from  first  possessors  –    the  very  opposite  of  respect  for  first 
possession. Conquest is a mode of original acquisition that we cannot sweep 
under the rug by pretending that it accords with any recognizable principle 
of justice. And conquest, unfortunately, is where American history starts – 
as does the title to almost every parcel of land in the United States. This is a 
highly inconvenient (not to say stunningly demoralizing) fact, not least of 
all  to  the  Indian  nations  that  continue  to  inhabit  the  North  American 
continent.  
 First  possession,  it  turns  out,  is  only  a  theory.  Our  actual  property 
system rests on the opposite view. William the Conqueror invaded England 
in 1066 and started the feudal system that was the source of all current titles 
to  land  there,  as  well  as  the  estates  system  that  is  the  centerpiece  of 
traditional  American  property  law.  The  European  colonizers  invaded 
America  and  seized  the  land  of  Indian  nations.  Contrary  to  what  the 
property law casebooks suggest, Great Britain and the United States rejected 
the doctrine of first possession; by adopting the doctrine of discovery, they 
refused to honor the rights of first possessors. Rather, they based property 
titles on their claims of racial superiority and they backed those claims by 
force.
10  They had many arguments  to justify  conquest as legitimate, just, 
honorable, and compatible with the wishes of God, but those arguments no 
longer strike us as convincing.
11  
 From  a  moral  point  of  view,  conquest  puts  all  current  land  titles  in 
doubt.12 Robert Nozick’s libertarian theory of the minimal state suggests that 
property rights are legitimate if they have their source in a just system of 
acquisition and then are freely transferred.
13 If their origin is tainted, the 
whole system fails.
14 How do we, as a nation, deal with the issue of conquest? 
                                                   
10 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005). 
11 See Robert A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF 
CONQUEST (1990). 
12 Epstein, supra  note 1, at 1241 ("A repudiation  of the first possession rule as a matter  of 
philosophical principle calls into question all titles."). 
13 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-182 (1974). 
14 Nozick provides for a right of rectification of wrongful initial taking of property – a right 
often ignored by most libertarians of a more practical bent who profess to follow Nozick’s 
philosophy. Id. at  150-153. SINGER 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We adopt two competing strategies. Half the time we engage in the time-
honored practice of repression; we deny this part of our history or sweep it 
under the rug. We ignore it or we acknowledge it only to marginalize it. The 
other half of the time we face the issue of conquest head on but we try to 
legitimate the events by which we acquired title from Indian nations.  
Let's start with the strategy of denial. Many of us protect ourselves from 
having to think too deeply about conquest by distancing ourselves from it. 
Amazingly, some property casebooks fail to mention Indians at all.
15 Most 
property casebooks treat it as unfortunate but past. The casebooks that deal 
with  conquest  immediately  follow  the  topic  with  cases  affirming  first 
possession as the root of title, as if to show that we have moved beyond 
barbarism to civilization. If we can relegate conquest to the distant past, we 
can concentrate instead on the fact that U.S. was founded on respect for 
property rights. We do not acquire property by conquest today. 
 This  comforting  story  is  misleading  at  best  and  false  at  worst.    We 
cannot comfort ourselves with the idea that conquest became a thing of the 
past with the American Revolution, independence from Great Britain, and 
the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. Like prior colonial powers, the United 
States claimed to share title to Indian lands with the Indian  nations who 
possessed and ruled those lands. In 1823, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the 
case of Johnson v. M’intosh that Indian lands were held under a unique estate 
in land called “Indian title” – a title split between the “ultimate title” held by 
the  United  States  and  a  “title  of  occupancy"  held  by  the  relevant  Indian 
nation.
16 This split title remains to this day; the majority of lands owned by 
Indian nations today is held in what is called “trust status” and is co-owned 
by the tribes and the United States. This assertion of co-ownership is an act 
of conquest that never ceased to this day. 
 More devastatingly, the conquest of Indian lands is not something that 
predates the United States. Nor did it happen only in our early history. The 
United States took most of the lands of Indian nations over the course of the 
nineteenth century, often for inadequate compensation and against the will 
of the Indian nation whose lands were greatly diminished. And during the 
Lochner era from the 1890s to the 1930s when the U.S. Supreme Court was at 
its activist height in striking down progressive legislation in the name of 
protecting  freedom  of  contract  and  private  property,  the  United  States 
forcibly took two-thirds of the remaining lands of the Indian nations. The 
U.S. took some of those lands from the tribes by eminent domain and resold 
them to non-Indians, but most of those seizures were taken from the tribes 
without any compensation at all; they were transferred in “allotments” to 
individual tribal members. The Supreme Court ruled that this tribal property 
could be taken without compensation because changing from communal to 
                                                   
15 One book that gives little attention to the Indian origins of property rights in the United 
States is GRANT S. NELSON, WILLIAM  B. STOEBUCK, & DALE A. WHITMAN, CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 
(3d ed. 2008). 
16 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). SINGER 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individual  ownership  constituted  a  “mere  change  in  the  form  of 
investment”
17 – a conclusion that would never be accepted in the non-Indian 
context.
18 
 Nor  did  these  deprivations  of  property  rights  cease as  the  twentieth 
century continued. In the 1950s, for example, the U.S. took timber from a 
band of the Tlingits who occupied southeastern Alaska. The Supreme Court 
held in 1955 that the Tee-Hit-Ton Band possessed merely a license to live on 
the land – revocable permission by the whites to occupy Alaskan territory. 
The consequence of this was that Alaska Natives had the right to live on the 
land  and  to  exclude  others,  but  they  possessed  no  “property”  rights  
protected by the fifth amendment.
19 Thus their land could be taken without 
compensation. This decision came one year after Brown v. Board of Education, 
and the Tee-Hit-Ton decision proclaimed that the constitution protects the 
property rights of all Americans except the natives who originally possessed 
the land – in other words, the first possessors. This is not ancient history; I 
was born the year before this decision was rendered. And this case has never 
been overruled, and the Supreme Court continues to cite it as good law.  
 To be clear that these acts of injustice are not necessarily past, consider 
the case of Navajo Nation v. United States, decided April 6, 2009 – just one year 
ago.
20 That case involved Navajo coal resources held under that peculiar joint 
title with the United States – a joint title that the U.S. exercises to oversee 
tribal leases of land to private corporations. The Navajo Nation argued that 
the U.S. mismanaged Navajo property, knowingly approving a lease for less 
than fair market value based on information the corporation had provided 
the United States that it failed to share with the tribe. The Supreme Court held 
that the tribe has no claim against the U.S. for mismanagement of tribal lands 
unless the U.S. has exerted complete control over the property or unless 
Congress has passed a statute explicitly granting the tribe a right of action to 
sue for damages for mismanagement. If the U.S. shares management with the 
tribe and engages in acts that harm tribal property rights, the tribe has no 
remedy unless Congress affirmatively chooses to provide one. So much for 
protection of tribal property.21 
Repression is a time-honored method for dealing with painful events. 
But if we face facts, we cannot be comforted with the idea that conquest is 
something that predates the United States. Nor is it a thing of the past to 
                                                   
17 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903). 
18 Imagine the city of Cambridge taking the property of Harvard University and transferring 
it to Harvard alumni or donors; given the fact that corporations are “persons” protected by 
the fourteenth amendment, there  is  no  question  that  this  would  be a  taking  of  Harvard’s 
property without just compensation. See Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, Or How to Take 
Property by Calling It a "Mere Change in the Form of Investment," 38 TULSA L. REV. 37 (2002). 
19 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
20 United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S.Ct. 1547 (U.S. 2009). 
21 For another recent example, see United States v. Newmont USA Ltd., 504 F.Supp.2d 1050, 
1061-1062 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (holding that the United States acquired "ownership" of polluted 
property previously owned by the Spokane Tribe through "discovery" and "conquest" even 
though no treaty or statute formally transferred such title to the United States). SINGER 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grant  Indian  nations  less  protection  for  their  property  rights  than  is 
granted to non-Indians. Conquest is part and parcel of the American story 
and it is not something we can treat as finished or completely repudiated. 
 If the denial strategy cannot work to give us moral comfort, perhaps 
conquest can be justified in some other way. What legitimating strategies are 
open to us? First, perhaps our titles are legitimate simply because the law 
declared  them  to  be  legitimate.  Theorists  have  long  debated  whether 
property comes from natural rights or government fiat. Conquest is an act 
of state power – usually by someone purporting to exercise that power for 
legitimate reasons and in justifiable ways. Positivists identify laws as coming 
from commands of the sovereign or rules created by government  officials 
empowered to make them. If property originates in an exercise of power by a 
recognized sovereign, then property comes from positive law. This is the 
position taken by Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham.
22 They argued that 
property  rights  are  created  by  law  to  achieve  various  social  purposes, 
especially promoting investment and attaining a secure life.   
 The positivist tradition might solve our problem. That theory says that 
property  rights  come  from  the  state;  they  neither  preexist  the  state in  a 
temporal sense nor have any moral validity independent of positive law. If 
we take this view, perhaps we can set aside those little moral questions of 
conquest and dispossession. Conquest was bad, yes, but it happened and we 
cannot undo it. Property must begin somewhere and in our system it begins 
with the seizure of Indian lands. Since we cannot rectify this in anything 
more than an imperfect way, we have no choice but to trace original title to 
property  back  to  the  governmental  act  of  seizing  Indian  territory  and 
transferring it to the first non-Indian owners. As Chief Justice John Marshall 
wrote in confronting this painful history, “Conquest gives a title which the 
Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative 
opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim 
which has been successfully asserted.”
23  
 There is something to this. We live, after all, in the real world. But moral 
claims are based, not on what is, but what should be. The law may declare me 
to be the owner of my house but that does not give us a reason to think the 
law is just. 
 A  second  legitimating  strategy  is  utilitarianism.  Perhaps  we  can  get 
beyond  all  this  by  remembering  that  positivists  like  Jeremy  Bentham 
generally seek support in the moral theory of cost-benefit analysis.
24 Let’s be 
pragmatic about all this. We are where we are because we got here the way we 
got here. In science fiction, you can redo things but in the real world, the 
past is past. The only rational thing to do is to start with the status quo – 
now, where we are – and see if any proposed changes in law or policy would 
                                                   
22  See  JEREMY  BENTHAM,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALS  AND  LEGISLATION 
(1780)(Dover Publications 2007); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Cambridge Univ. Press, Richard 
Tuck ed., rev'd student ed. 2008)  
23 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823). 
24 BENTHAM, supra note 22, at  1-43. SINGER 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make us collectively better off. Thus, both Hobbes and Bentham suggested a 
utilitarian calculus – Hobbes, by suggesting that we are all better off vesting 
full authority in the state to allocate and define property rights and Bentham 
by suggesting a more modern conception of cost/benefit analysis designed 
to test current laws by their contribution to the general welfare.
25 This line 
of thought suggests not inquiring too deeply into the origins of property 
rights.  The  costs  of  rectifying  those  unjust  origins  surely  outweigh  the 
benefits; after all, are all the inhabitants of the American continent other 
than Native Americans supposed to return to Europe or Africa or Asia? Who 
would they displace if they went back to the land of their ancestors? No: on 
this view, the injustice of origins is something we best relegate to history 
courses; it may be important to tell the story but it should not impact current 
law or policy regarding ownership of land. The utilitarian solution suggests 
that we start from current distributions of land, whatever their origins, and 
ask whether a redistribution of title creates benefits that outweigh the costs. 
 This solution may be attractive but its attractions are illusory. For one 
thing, it is not clear why we should view the status quo as a neutral and 
morally defensible starting place. If a thief has possession of a car, we do not 
presume the thief has the right to keep the car; we do not compare the costs to 
the thief of returning the car to the benefits to the owner in retrieving her 
car. The status quo baseline presumes that Indian nations should be content 
with what they have but if we stole their land from them, it is not clear why 
this should be the case.  
 Even if we could view the status quo distribution of land between Indian 
nations and the United States as a neutral starting place, it is not clear how 
we  should  value  the  costs  and  benefits  of  changing  from  one  property 
distribution to another. Perhaps we should simply recognize that Indians are 
a small percentage  of  the U.S. population and that  granting  such a small 
group title to all the land in the U.S. cannot possibly increase social welfare. 
The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. But if we think about 
social utility in this way, we then can justify doing anything to a minority 
group as long as the majority group wins. Modern utilitarian theory refuses 
to accept the idea that costs and benefits should be measured in that way. The 
moral impulse behind utilitarian theory is to count each person as one and no 
more than one. It is premised, in other words, on the sanctity and equality of 
all individuals.  To  sacrifice one for  the benefit of  others is  to  violate the 
principle  of  equal  concern  and  respect  for  each  individual  that  is  the 
underlying  normative  premise  on  which  utilitarianism  is  based.  For  this 
reason,  sophisticated  moral  theorists  who  adopt  utilitarianism  as  an 
approach  argue  for  a morally-constrained  version  of  the  theory.
26  Those 
moral  constraints  ensure  that  costs  and  benefits  are  not  valued  and 
                                                   
25 HOBBES, supra note 22, at ch.18, at 121–129 ; BENTHAM, supra note 22, at  1-43. 
26  MARK  TIMMONS,  MORAL  THEORY  144–147  (2002);  WILL  KYMLICKA,  CONTEMPORARY  POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION  26–32, 37–45 (2d ed. 2002). SINGER 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compared  in  a  manner  that  allows  the  many  to  ignore  completely  the 
interests of the few. 
 Government  fiat,  without  more,  is  unacceptable  as  a  just  source  of 
original title to property, but a utilitarian cost-benefit calculus cannot help 
us unless we figure out what moral constraints to use in valuing costs and 
benefits. How do we define those moral constraints? Perhaps the natural 
rights tradition stands us on firmer ground.  
 A third legitimating strategy justifies current land titles by the idea that 
we  can  trace  our  titles  to  the  first  possessors  of  the  land.  We  actually 
acquired most of the land in the U.S. by transactions with Indian nations. 
Most  treaties  with Indian Nations involved transfers  of land  from those 
nations to the United States for substantial amounts of money. In short, we 
bought America from the Indians.
27 Some property law casebooks adopt this 
strategy, acknowledging that federal law prevented the tribes from selling to 
anyone but the United States.
28 If first possession is the origin of title, then 
we can rest easy that we have good property rights because we acquired our 
title by buying  the land from the first possessors.  We actually do have a 
legitimate chain of title and a legitimate origin after all. 
 There is one major problem with this legitimating story. Those transfers 
were less than voluntary. Consider a story I recall being told by my college 
economics  professor,  Randall  Bartlett.  You  are  in  a  deep  pit  filled  with 
poisonous snakes and I come along and offer to sell you the use of a ladder. 
In  exchange  I  ask  only  that  you  give  me  half  your  future  earnings  and 
custody of your firstborn child. You agree to buy and I agree to sell. The deal 
is  Pareto  efficient;  we  are  both  better  off  afterwards  than  we  were 
beforehand. Why not enforce the contract? I had no legal duty to help you 
and  I  did  not  hold  a  gun  to  your  head;  I  simply  offered  you  a  pleasant 
alternative to an impending painful death and you eagerly accepted. 
 Pleasant as the alternative may be, it is still a coerced deal. We did not 
have equal bargaining power; indeed, you had no bargaining power at all. I 
could have gotten  you  to  agree to be my  slave and  you might  well have 
accepted. What I offered was only a little better than that. Besides there are 
some demands we are not allowed to make in a free and democratic society 
that treats each person with equal concern and respect. T.H. White wrote in 
The  Once  and  Future  King  that  King  Arthur  explained:  "What  I  meant  by 
civilization  when  I  invented  it,  was  simply  that  people  ought  not  take 
advantage of weakness."
29 No: the treaties entered into with Indian nations 
did commendably reflect the U.S. view that Indian nations did have some 
property rights in their lands but those treaties cannot be defended on the 
ground that they constitute voluntary transactions.  Nor  can  we comfort 
                                                   
27 Felix Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 35 (1947)("the historic fact is that 
practically all of the real estate acquired by the United States since 1776 was purchased not 
from Napoleon or any other emperor or czar but from its original Indian owners"). 
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(2009). 
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ourselves with the observation that the Indians were compensated for their 
land. Such compensation is not adequate to rectify the injustices of conquest. 
 Recall that this was the argument made by advocates for Suzette Kelo 
who sought an injunction stopping the city of New London, Connecticut 
from taking her house.
30 She asked, not for heightened compensation, but 
for the power to refuse to allow the transfer of title to happen at all; she 
wanted  a  right  to  keep  her  home  and  argued  that  compensation  of  any 
amount was not a fair substitute for her power to decide when, if  ever, to sell 
her home. If she was right, then compensation is not an adequate remedy for 
an unjust seizure of land. 
 The Supreme Court in Kelo allowed the city to  take her house  so  the 
property  could  be  redeveloped  along  with  other  property  in  the 
neighborhood to revitalize the local economy. That Supreme Court opinion 
unleashed a storm of  criticism. Some critics suggested that never before in 
U.S. history did the government take property from some to transfer it to 
others simply because the government thought those others could use the 
property better than the original owners. It would be good to remember that 
this is exactly what happened when tribal lands were taken for transfer to 
non-Indians.  And  those  lands  taken  from  Indian  nations  amount  to  98 
percent of the land in the United States. Americans may be outraged by the 
Kelo decision but almost all of them are living on land taken from one owner 
and given to their predecessors in interest. The uncomfortable truth is that 
the history of the entire country is founded on this precise injustice. 
 A fourth legitimating  strategy – and perhaps the most important – is 
time.  Too  much  time has  passed  to  rectify  the  wrongs  of  conquest.  This 
recognition of political reality is one we cannot ignore. It may be the best 
argument to affirm current non-Indian titles to land.31 Yet, it does not give 
us a just source of title. Again to quote T.H. White: "Unfortunately we have 
tried to establish Right by Might, and you can't do that."
32  
Where does that leave us? The answer is that it leaves us in an uncomfortable 
place. Both the great philosophers and our property law casebooks argue that 
the origins of property rights are crucial to determining their legitimacy but 
if our land titles have no legitimate root of title, then the whole system is 
placed in doubt. 
What is the answer to our dilemma? To begin with, we must reject the 
path of denial and repression. We must tell our history and tell it accurately – 
the good and the bad. As someone once said, the truth will set us free but first 
it will make us miserable. There is bad news here but there is good news as 
well.  
 First the bad news. We cannot trace our land titles to a just origin and 
we should stop pretending we can. Our titles come from a combination of 
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property deprivations). 
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military  conquest  of  sovereign  nations  and  forced  relocations  of  free 
peoples. Not a pretty picture and we should stop denying it. 
Now the good news. The United States is a democracy. It is not perfect 
but it tries to live by the principle that governments derive their power from 
the  consent  of  the  governed  while  limiting  the  power  of  elected 
representatives  through  legal  protection  of  fundamental  constitutional 
rights. We did not simply kill all the native inhabitants, as happened in some 
countries, and, for the most part, we did not declare the land to be vacant 
terra nullius open for occupation. Rather, from the time of the adoption of the 
U.S. Constitution, the United States did partially recognize the pre-existing 
property rights of Indian nations and it arranged for transfers of title from 
those nations to the United States.  
 In three crucial opinions decided by the Supreme Court in  the 1820's and 
30's, Chief Justice John Marshall sought to slow down the march of conquest 
by announcing that Indian lands could not be taken without the full and 
voluntary  consent  of  the  Indian  owners.33  Those  opinions  were  not 
completely admirable; they contained offensive racist language and justified 
the discovery doctrine by claiming that Indians were savage and uncivilized. 
But they also tried to enact U.S. ideals. They did so by admitting the injustice 
of conquest and adopting legal rules designed to limit its injustices in the 
future. 
The United States ignored the rule that tribal property could not be taken 
forcibly and against the will of the Indian tribes. Again and again the U.S. 
took tribal property involuntarily. But the transfers did affirm that the tribes 
had legitimate initial partial title to their lands, and much of the time, those 
transfers were accompanied by substantial compensation. In addition, the 
Congress passed a statute in 1946 called the Indian Claims Commission Act that 
allowed  Indian  nations  to  bring  lawsuits  against  the  United  States  for 
compensation if they could show that they had not been fairly compensated 
for their lands to begin with.34 That law was far from perfect but it reflected 
American values and attempted to extend them to the first possessors of our 
lands. 
 We need to rewrite our history books so that our children understand 
the actual process by which we acquired title to lands in the U.S. Most of our 
children learn that our lands were acquired from other colonial powers but 
they do not learn as much about the history of Indian land cessions. And 
most of our children are not taught that Indian nations still own 2 percent of 
the land in the U.S. or that the federal government recognizes 564 Indian 
nations  that enjoy  government-to-government  relations  with the United 
States. And our law students are taught the relations between the federal and 
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state governments but many are not taught about the hundreds  of  other 
sovereigns that continue, against all odds, to live among us non-Indians.  
 The answer to our problem of origins of property rights is the practice of 
democracy.  Democracy  entails  the  idea  of  collective  governance  over  the 
conditions  of  our  lives  while also  recognizing  respect  for  human  rights. 
Laws adopted by elected representatives have some claim to legitimacy even 
if  they  concern  property  rights,  and  constitutions  have  some  claim  to 
legitimacy if they are adopted by the people themselves. As has been pointed 
out by Milner Ball and Philip Frickey, the Indian nations did not sign the 
Constitution.
35  How  then  did  they  become  incorporated  legally  into  the 
United  States?  The  answer  is  that,  if  they  did  become  incorporated 
legitimately  and  legally,  it  happened  through  the  treaty  process.  Treaties 
with  Indian  nations,  Frickey  argues,  are  quasi-constitutional  documents. 
And Robert Williams explains that most Indian nations regard treaties as 
relationships of mutual respect and ongoing engagement.
36 The treaties with 
Indian nations were not one-time contracts that involved transfers of title 
but entailed mutual recognition of continuing government-to-government 
relationships between Indian nations and the United States – a policy that 
has been formally expressed by every President, Republican and Democrat, 
since Richard Nixon. 
  If conquest is not a legitimate source of title, then land in the U.S. was 
not  obtained legitimately from  Indian  nations.  That means  that  we  non-
Indians are living on Indian land. We have no choice but to live with the 
burdens of history. The democratic way to deal with this is to reduce the 
injustices associated with conquest. The absolute minimum that we could do 
today to accomplish this is to stop engaging in acts of conquest now. That means 
respecting  retained  tribal  property  rights  and  respecting  the  existing 
sovereignty  of  Indian  nations.  I  am  sometimes  asked  why  we  should 
recognize tribal sovereignty. This question betrays ignorance both about 
American history and current U.S. law. Tribal sovereignty exists now. It has 
always existed, and it is recognzied by U.S. law. It pre-exists the United States 
and represents sovereignty that the United States never extinguished. To 
limit  the  sovereign  powers  of  Indian  nations  over  their  reserved  lands 
without their consent is to engage in an act of conquest. That should stop. 
Our land titles do not have a just origin but we have attempted to rectify 
this by providing partial compensation to Indian nations for their lost lands 
and  by  adopting  a  policy  of  self-determination,  recognizing  tribal 
sovereignty and reserved property rights. This means respecting tribal off-
reservation  hunting  and  fishing  and  water  rights,  and  on-reservation 
powers to govern tribal territories free of state law. Tribes who seek such 
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Marshalling the Past: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 
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protections  are  not  asking  for  special  rights  denied  to  others.  They  are 
asking that we not continue the practice of conquest.  
 
II. FROM POSSESSION TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
 
Now we must turn our attention to the Lockean proviso. Locke argued 
that first possession is a legitimate source of title only if there is “there is 
enough and as good left in common for others.”
37 Locke went on to argue 
that private property was justified even though all the land is taken because 
the adoption of a money economy left everyone better off than before we 
adopted the social institution of private property.
38 On that theory, we have 
nothing to worry about from the Lockean proviso. Surely a system of private 
property and market relations is better than not having such a system at all. 
Homeless families may suffer from the lack of a place to sleep at night but we 
would all be worse off if we did not recognize the right of owners to exclude 
non-owners from their homes. 
 Given the current recession and the harsh struggles of many Americans 
to  find  work,  we  should  not  dismiss  the  Lockean  proviso  so  easily.  Nor 
should we ignore the fact that family background is the best predictor of 
future  economic  status.  According  to  Locke,  private  property  is  justified 
only if each person has an equal chance to become an owner. It is a question 
of debate what that principle requires but it is a major error for property law 
casebooks  to justify  original acquisition  of property by   reference to the 
principle of first possession without acknowledging the Lockean proviso or 
in some way to address the distributive issues involved in a private property 
system.  We  would  be  untrue  to  the  normative  reasons  that  make  first 
possession legitimate if we did not teach that first possession is legitimate 
only if others have equal opportunities to acquire property themselves. What 
are the consequences of this principle? 
 The conservative view is that existing distributions of property must be 
respected. Both redistribution and taxation of property designed to take the 
property of some to be transferred to others are per se illegitimate. Property 
rights  are  either  respected  or  they  are  not  respected;  to  take  someone's 
property to give it to someone else is never justified.39 And limitations on the 
rights  of  owners  are  simply another  means  of  taking  some  sticks  in  the 
bundle of rights that goes along with ownership and transferring them to 
others.  The  natural  rights  tradition  suggests  that  property  rights  have a 
strong  normative  basis  that  justifies  legal  protection  regardless  of  the  
consequences of protecting those rights; on this view, one cannot be for 
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property and for redistributive efforts that transfer property from the rich 
to the poor. 
Progressives, on the other hand, advocate redistribution of property to 
promote equality. Doesn't this represent an attack on property rights? The 
answer is no.40 Recall why the first possession story is so prevalent both in 
our property casebooks and in our national myths. People need homes where 
they can rest, play, and enjoy human relationships. Property is necessary for 
liberty. That is why we should allow people to possess land. Because we live 
in  a  democracy  that  seeks  to  treat  each  person  with  equal  concern  and 
respect, the right to acquire property cannot be limited to those lucky few 
who came first. If property is necessary for liberty, and if each person has an 
equal right to be free, then it follows that property rights are not justified 
unless  each  person  has  an  equal  opportunity  to  acquire  the  property 
necessary for a full human life. When Texas economist Robert Montgomery 
was questioned during the McCarthy era about whether he favored private 
property, he replied, "I do – so strongly that I want everyone in Texas to have 
some."
41 
If this is so, we must reject the idea that property rights are absolute and 
that taxation and regulation designed to promote equal opportunity violates 
property rights. Libertarians like Robert Nozick have it exactly backwards. 
Nozick argued that if thousands of people pay money to see a great basketball 
player like Wilt Chamberlin, why doesn’t he have a right to keep the money?42 
The answer is that property rights, if they become very unequally distributed 
over time, give the wealthy more and more power over economic and social 
life. Equal opportunity is not something that happens once and then we are 
indifferent to the distribution of abilities to acquire property in the future. If 
one is born to a poor family and attends a poor public school and has less 
access  to  the  social  and  economic  means  to  get  ahead,  the  resulting 
distribution of property cannot be characterized as just even if our goal is 
maximizing liberty. As Jeremy Waldron and Frank Michelman have argued, if 
property  is  needed  for  liberty,  then  each  person  must  have  a  realistic 
opportunity to acquire the material bases for exercising those liberties.43  
Nozick argued that we should adopt an historical approach to property. 
He meant  that  we establish just means  of  original acquisition, allow  free 
transfers, and then respect the property rights that emerge regardless of 
their distribution. But this is an odd approach to history. A true historical 
approach would start with what really happened rather than a fictitious state 
of nature. As I have noted,our property history begins in 1066 when William 
conquered England and began the feudal system. He gave the whole country 
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to dozens of his family and friends and established a hierarchical society. 
Over time, both Great Britain and the United States moved from feudalism to 
democracy.  Eventually  we  abolished  slavery;    we  have  abolished  racial 
segregation; we have abolished the rights of husbands to control their wives' 
property. Our democratic system of property starts, not with the state of 
nature, but the constitutional prohibition on titles of nobility and with laws 
that prohibit social relationships that give some people unwarranted power 
over others. Democracies do not allow people to create any and all forms of 
ownership; many types of property relationships are banned. They are off 
the menu. Laws and policies designed to promote equal opportunities for all 
are  not  infringements  on  property  rights.  They  are  the  only  thing  that 
justifies property rights in a democracy.44 
 We do not acquire property today by staking claims in the wilderness. 
Original acquisition of property today comes, not from conquest or first 
possession, but from family,  work, and investment.  Most people acquire 
property  initially  from  their  parents  who  care  for  them,  provide  them  a 
home, and help them find their way in the world. If family is a major source of 
original  acquisition  of  property  today,  then  children  whose  parents  are 
poor,  and  cannot  provide  for  them, are at a  severe  disadvantage.
45  Equal 
opportunity will exist only if both law and government policy actively seek 
to create it. 
 Outside  the  family,  most  property  is  acquired  through  work, 
investment,  and  exchange.  These  methods  of  acquisition  involve 
collaborative ventures with others. These social and economic relationships 
are  mediated  and  regulated  by  law.  Americans  often  say  they  distrust 
government  but  they  demand  laws  that  impose  minimum  standards  for 
contractual relationships. Our most libertarian states regulate the workplace 
to ensure that we have safe places to work and that we do not face unjust 
discrimination on the job. They regulate insurance companies and banks so 
that our money is there when we need it. They regulate consumer products 
like cars to ensure that they are safe and perform as advertised. They regulate 
land use so that our homes and businesses can expect a secure, unpolluted, 
and  pleasant  environment.  They  regulate  professions  like  building 
contractors,  lawyers  and  doctors  to  ensure  that  we  do  not  entrust  our 
money and our lives to quacks. These regulations are not designed to take 
away our liberty; these laws are what makes us free.
46 
 The estates system may be arcane and confusing but the principle behind 
it is crucial: some packages of property rights are unlawful in a free and 
democratic society.  We outlaw particular packages of rights because they are 
incompatible with our way of life; democracies do not countenance titles of 
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nobility, feudal relations of unequal status, apartheid, or plantation slavery. 
Sometimes we outlaw particular packages because they interfere with the 
welfare-promoting functions  of a free market; they inhibit alienability or 
they  impede  competition  or  they  cause  other  harmful  externalities.  The 
current  recession,  caused  by  the  subprime  mortgage  foreclosure  crisis, 
means that never again will it be difficult for property law professors to 
explain that it should be illegal to create certain packages of property rights. 
Securitized subprime mortgages granted without adequate record keeping or 
safeguards  have  resulted  in  toxic  assets  that  have  wrecked  the  world 
economy. There are reasons not to allow such packages to be created in the 
first place.  
Libertarians  argue  that  property  rights  cannot  be  limited  or 
redistributed to promote equality because this violates the rights of owners. 
But property rights are not, and cannot be, absolute. The only way to have 
absolute  property  rights  is  to  follow  Thomas  Hobbes  and  give  all  the 
property to a king or queen and let them have full power over it. But that 
kind  of  society  is  a  monarchy  or  a  tyranny.  If  you  want  to  live  in    a 
democracy, then property rights must be limited by law. If you want every 
person  to  have  the  chance  to  become  an  owner  and  if  you  want  their 
property  rights  to  enjoy  basic  protections,  then  you  must  regulate  the 
packages  of  rights  that  can  be  created.  Property  exists  only  if  we  have 
property  law,  and  law  exists  only  if  we  have  government  to  issue 
regulations. One cannot be for property and against government. 
This means that the rights of current owners must be limited to ensure 
that everyone can become an owner. Nor does this violate the normative 
basis of our story of origins – quite the contrary. Property rights have just 
origins today only if each person has the equal opportunity to acquire them. 
The  legitimate  origin  of  property  is  not  first  possession  but  equal 
opportunity.  This  means  that  the  progressives  were  right  all  along.  We 
cannot be indifferent to the unjust origins of property; but it is equally true 
that we cannot be indifferent to the social, economic, and legal barriers that 
continue  to  prevent  access  to  the  property  system  today.  Our  most 
important  philosophical  traditions  are  premised on  the  twin  concepts  of 
democracy and equal opportunity. And if that is true, then using democratic 
means to limit or reallocate property rights to ensure equal opportunity and 
to promote social relations compatible with a free and democratic society is 
not only not a violation of property rights but compelled by the very reasons 
we created property rights in the first place. 
 Our  more  enduring  normative  basis  for  the  original  acquisition  of 
property is not the concept of first possession – and certainly not conquest. 
It is, instead, the democratic ideal of equal opportunity.47 If that is so, then 
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the extent to which such equal opportunity does or does not exist becomes a 
question of fundamental importance. 